A Map of Value

SA 2022-2023 - Ects: 4

Descrizione del seminario: philosophers and fools often refer to values – to beauty, sublimity, grace, agreeableness, the values of health and of knowledge, the sacred. This course looks at values from the point of view of ontology, ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of language, epistemology and the philosophy of mind. It also pays particular attention to the variety of value.
Modalità di valutazione: an essay (3 000 words).
Bibliografia essenziale:
• Dancy, J. 2005 “Should we Pass the Buck?”, in. eds. Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. & Zimmerman, M. J. 2005 Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Berlin: Springer, pp. 33-44.
• Findlay, J. Axiological Ethics
• Fine, K. 2005 “The Varieties of Necessity”, in: Modality and Tense, Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 235-260.
• Hochberg, H 1969 “Moore’s Ontology and Nonnatural Properties”, ed E. Klemke, Studies in the Philosophy of G. E; Moore, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 95-127.
• Lemos, N. M., 1994, Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, Cambridge University Press
• Lewis, D. 1989 “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63: 113–137.
• Mackie, J. 1986 Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
• Moore, G.E. 1922 The Conception of Intrinsic Value, in Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 253–275.
• 1966 Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press
• Mulligan, K. 1998 “From Appropriate Emotions to Values”, Secondary Qualities Generalized, ed. P. Menzies, The Monist, 84, 1, 161-188.
• 2009 “Values”, The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, eds. R. Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal & R. Cameron, London: Routledge, 401-411.
• 2009 „On Being Struck by Value – Exclamations, Motivations and Vocations“,Leben mit Gefühlen. Emotionen, Werte und ihre Kritik, ed. Barbara Merkel, Paderborn: mentis-Verlag, 141-161.
• 2010 “Emotions and Values”, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, 475-500.
• Prichard, H. A. 1912 “Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?, Mind, N.S., Vol. 21
• Putnam, H. 2002 The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
• Rabinowicz, W. & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. 2004 “The Strike of the Demon: OnFitting Pro-Attitudes and Value”, Ethics, 114, 391-423.
• Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. & Zimmerman, M. J. (eds.) 2005 Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Berlin: Springer.
• Scanlon, T. M. 1998 What we owe to each other, Harvard University Press • von Wright, G. H. 1963 The Varieties of Goodness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.